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awareness of it, thus making the DST an interesting task to
evaluate implicit behaviour.

Introduction

Experimental procedure

The law of less work (Hull, 1943) is our natural tendency
given two alternatives with equal incentives to pick the less
demanding one. This notion also appears in the field of
judgment and decision making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), it is referred to as
internal cost of effort. Cognitive parsimony is our tendency
to favour low-effort strategies that help us to decide faster
and simple strategies to approach a complex problem. An
experimental paradigm for this phenomenon has been
developed by Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick (2010)
and referred to as the demand selection task. In this poster,
we present a model of this task developed in the ACT-R
architecture (Anderson, 2007), which offers an hypothesis
as to which cognitive mechanisms might participate in this
phenomenon.

We reproduced Experiment 1 from Kool et al’s paper
(2010). The simulation included 50 runs of 500 trials of the
Demand Selection Task (DST). The task was self-paced
with a maximum limit of time of 1h (which was never
reached by the model or the participants). Subjects had to
pick between two decks, by pressing a key (“F” for left, “J”
for right). According to the color of the number (yellow or
blue), participants had to either produce a parity judgment
(even or odd) or a magnitude judgment (less or greater than
five) on the number. Depending on the deck selected, the
color of the number switched with a probability of 0.9
(making it a higher demand task) or 0.1 (making it a lower
demand task) at each trial.

Model
1

The model was built in the computational cognitive
architecture and theory of human cognition ACT-R
(Adaptive Control of Thought - Rational) (Anderson, 1990;
2007). In ACT-R, different modules, including two memory
modules (procedural and declarative) interact to complete a
cognitive task. The modules are accessed via their
associated buffers. ACT-R has been used to model several
tasks. Declarative memory stores facts about the
environment (know what). The procedural memory, through
procedural rules (know how), allows for action selection.
ACT-R is a hybrid cognitive architecture composed of
symbolic and subsymbolic components: the retrieval of a
fact (symbol) from declarative memory depends on
subsymbolic retrieval equations (pondering the context and
history of retrieval of the fact), and, the selection of a rule
(symbol) depends on utility subsymbolic equations (which
computes costs and benefits associated to the rule). The
memory elements (chunks) are reinforced through patterns
of occurrence within the environment. Learning processes
act at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels.
The preference of a deck over another one relies on implicit
mechanisms: mainly base-level and spreading activation
with the participation of utility learning. Base-level learning

Demand Selection Task
In the demand selection task (Kool et al., 2010), two
decks of cards are placed symmetrically left and right of the
center of the screen. The keyboard is used to select one of
the decks and uncover the card upon which a digit, between
1 and 9, will be displayed. According to the color of the
number, the subject has to perform a different type of
judgement. Blue calls for a magnitude judgment: if the
number is less than five, subjects should say yes, otherwise
no. Yellow calls for a parity judgment: if the number is
even, subjects should say yes, otherwise, no. Unbeknownst
to the participants, one deck leads to a low demand task and
the other deck to a high demand task. Participants are
instructed to ‘Feel free to move from one deck to the other
whenever you choose’ and ‘if one deck begins to seem
preferable, feel free to chose that deck the more often’. In
the low demand task, the color of each numeral matches the
previous color on 90% of trials, whereas in the high demand
task, the color of each numeral matches the previous color
on 10% of trials. Overall, response times (RT) and error
rates showed that task switching was cognitively costly, and
that subjects mostly choose to pick the less cognitively
demanding deck. While some subjects demonstrated their
awareness of this effect, the effect did not depend on their

1
Model
code
available
scholar.wright.edu/astecca/software
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effects for trial types (F (1,50) = 9.940; p < 0.002) and deck
types (F (1,50) = 3.691; p < 0.05). Average selection of the
lower demanding task is 63% in our experiment (68% in the
original experiment).

determines how patterns of use affect chunk activation and
decay. Spreading activation provides context to the retrieval
since chunks will spread an amount of activation to other
chunks in declarative memory, based on the relationship
they have with other chunks. The choice between the two
decks is represented by two procedures. After the model
picks one deck, it perceives a number and a color, and then
it retrieves the chunks associated to the color and the
number. Chunks of the yellow color are associated with a
‘parity’ chunk, chunks of the ‘blue’ color are associated
with a ‘magnitude’ chunk. The retrieved chunk is placed in
the imaginal module. A judgement is produced based on the
retrieved chunk, and an answer is vocalized. The chunk
placed in the imaginal buffer will spread activation and
influence the next retrieval request. A reward is back
propagated after the answer has been produced. The failure
to retrieve a judgment chunk will lead to errors which are
also signaled to the model by backpropagation.

Table 1: Model parameters.
Parameters
Value
:rt
-1.0
:alpha
0.1
:lf
1.5
:mas
3.0
:imaginal-activation
0.41
:ans
0.1
:bll
0.21

Discussion and conclusion
The demand selection task is aimed at evaluating the
tendency to avoid cognitively demanding tasks.
Computational cognitive models have been made of
“minimal control” (Taatgen, 2007) and “least effort”
(Anderson, 1990), but this is to our knowledge the first
model of the DST. We were able to reproduce the results of
Experiment 1 of Kool et al.’s paper (2010) with a simple
ACT-R model. The performance at the DST in our
explanation relies mainly on implicit mechanisms (utility
learning and base-level and spreading activation), in
accordance with experimental results showing that the
participants did not need to be aware of the type of task (low
demanding or high demanding) for the effect to be
observed. The DST is interesting to correlate subjects’
individual differences with their performance at different
cognitive tasks. Having a model of such a task will allow us
in future work to model individual differences as captured in
the DST model and as they transfer into other tasks and
might affect performance there (e.g. we are currently using
this task in an ongoing research studying the relationship
between cognitive parsimony and vulnerability to
exploitation in interpersonal transactions).

Figure 1: Mean RT by options.
Therefore, the gradual selection of the lower demanding
deck occurs through two mechanisms: the retrieval of
elements in the higher demanding deck (with high
probability of switch) will take longer (representing the
expended effort required) as activation from the previous
trial will have spread less to the current trial. And, the
longer this process takes, the less reward gets backpropagated to the selection of this deck (as the reward gets
discounted with time). Thus, gradually, the selection of the
less demanding deck is the one that is going to be reinforced
the most. Errors encountered will be due to the failure of
retrieval of judgment chunks.
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Results
As in the original experiment, we measured the verbal RT
for the two decks (low demand vs. high demand) and trial
types (task switch vs. task repetition). Figure 1 shows the
means of medians for each trial types and deck types.
Table 1 shows the parameters used in the ACT-R model. An
ANOVA indicated as in the original experiment significant
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